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We must look our mistakes squarely in the face 
lest we fall into repeating them.
- Rui Balthasar Santos
Rector, Eduardo Mondlane University
To plan is to choose 
Choose to go forward.
- Mwalimu Julius Nyerere
From Where? By Whom?
In reviewing ideologies, theories, discourse, actual policy and performance in 
respect to development in Africa and/or African development a basic question 
is whose perceptions, goals and actions are to be central and from what 
vantage point (of location, commitment and concern) they are to be reviewed.
One approach - that used by a majority of non-African writers including 
Professor Murteira - adopts a global (or external) vantage point and does not 
seek to distinguish African from in or in respect to Africa. This is a 
perfectly plausible choice but it is quite different from an Africa centred 
perspective reviewing African thought, discourse, pronouncement and action 
from the context of African (or alternative sets of African) historic and 
contextual goals, opportunities and contraints. The present author should 
perhaps put his position squarely at the outset. At a recent conference at 
which he was commentator on an international financial institution lead paper 
its author (himself an African) commented that the paper was sound and its 
criticisms valid but added "but the trouble is, he is on the Africans* side".
Evidently the African position on issues such as those under discussion does 
not exist. Mimeticism and other neo-european approaches are very common. 
That Professor Murteira uses a very mimetic, self expatriated African scholar
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and UNESCO whose period of African leadership was very much mimetic of the
pprevious French leadership as African criticism of mimeticism illustrates the
depth of the problem. Africans with European or European worldview training
can be plus europeene que les europeenes as can their own African students.^
Moreover, the dominant power configurations, intellectual concerns, historical
records and present contexts vary greatly among and within states. Just as
Portuguese and British thought on the whole evaluates the consequences of the
Treaty of Methuen rather differently - with Portuguese enthusiasm rather
understandably far less marked than British! - so too African perspectives on
the same events (or goals) can diverge widely. The divergences can be with
Europeans - Portuguese claims to four hundred years of cooperative human
interchange with Africans ring rather oddly in Lusophone African ears. But it
can be among African of different backgrounds. For Coastal Ghanaian
historians the 19th Century Fanti Confederacy was their defensive alliance to
roll back Ashanti imperialism; for Ashanti historians it was a British
pre-colonial neo-colonial ploy to break Ashanti's legitimate suzerainty over
the coast. For Marxist and Schumpeterian African economists to the same
dynamics look quite different as to social and economic consequences and
normative acceptability even if they can agree on the empirical data and
events. Nonetheless, almost any Africa based and African centred approach is
qualitatively, not marginally, different from most global or any Eurocentric 
4ones.
At what level?
Another question is the level on which attention is concentrated. One common 
choice especially in relation to ideology and theory is to concentrate on the 
intellectual (academic and institutional research pronunciamento) level. This 
again is a plausible choice but not the only reasonable one and one requiring 
complementary studies at different levels to give a holistic perspective.
There is no simple interaction between on the one hand global, imported or 
import substition academic writing and discourse and on the other, actual 
operational goals (or for that matter Utopias), strategies, policies and 
results. This remains true even of major political figures who are also major 
intellectuals, e.g. Leopold Sedar Senghor, Robert Mugabe, Julius Nyerere. 
Therefore one alternative or complementary frame is to examine the statements,
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operational documents and actions of African leaders and political groupings 
as well as of their main official, technical and managerial cadres (and, where 
this is relevant, of the African business community).
Clearly any such approach is problematic. Pronouncements or even 
pronouncements and operational documents do - taken by themselves -give a 
romanticised and incomplete picture as Aquino da Braganza argued cogently in 
his last work. To rely on them alone leads first to an uncritical adoration 
of instant utopias the Africans idealised by their largely expatriate analysts 
either never aspired to or never claimed were attainable in the short run and,
later in reaction, to root and branch condemnations with an equal lack of
5perspective.
What any such exercise in examining applied statements does do is to cast 
overwhelming doubt on the assertion that either maximum economic growth or 
industrialisation as such have been central to African development strategy or 
ideology and to raise questions about what '’modernisation” and "tradition” 
mean in specific contexts.^1 Incidentally, it also warns against assuming that 
internationally oriented statements on - e.g. liberalisation - can be
interpreted in policy and action terms without reference to parallel national
7actions and statements.
A yet broader stance - and one very rarely adopted because of its difficulty - 
would be a systematic examination of elite, counter-elite and 'popular' 
ideologies, concepts, goals and interests in respect to development.
Initially these would need to be national, both because the patterns are
unlikely to be the same - or even very similar - in different states and 
because without them no comparative study on a regional or a continental basis 
is practicable.
Economics: Master or Means?
Very few people other than professional economists equate economics or even 
material growth with development. In his lead paper Professor Murteira is 
quite careful to underline the limitations of economics as a total explanation
of, or format for achieving development and does cite at length a
8 9 neo-Rousseaian modeller and at least three political economists who are, in
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different ways, deeply concerned about overly narrow economistic frames for 
conceptualisation, analysis and - especially goal and policy formulation and 
implementation. But despite this the bulk of his paper is a presentation and 
commentary on economic - and nominally non-political economic - ideology and 
analysis. That is telling evidence on the imperial pretensions of economics 
and political economy both over policy and over other disciplines and ways of 
discourse and, in particular, so-called 'value free', 'scientific' economics.
That is indeed a global problem - not merely an African one. Oddly it results 
in part from the fact that applied political economists are often by no means 
as triumphalist as is sometime supposed. It was John Maynard Keynes who 
suggested that the ideal analogue to an economist's role was that of a plumber 
or a dentist - a useful handyman who identified and fixed a problem to allow 
(not to cause nor to define) better living conditions. And on that analogue 
an economist, while a skilled artisan with autonomy as to defining a number of 
aspects of problem solving, worked to goals and within constraints set by his 
employer. Most economic advisers and operational specialists - between bouts 
of folie de grandeur when they try on the role of Platonic Guardians - do see 
their work that way.
One problem is that many other disciplines do not. They, in practice, decline 
to address their minds to finding the best (least bad) practicable answer to a 
set question within a set time frame. Economists are ready (sometimes too 
ready) to do precisely that even in fields in respect to which their
discipline and experience are not very enlightening. And so one has
economists advising on politics, sociology, history and psychology not 
necessarily from arrogance (and quite possibly on a "fools rush in where 
angels fear to tread" basis) but to fill vacuums.
An equal problem is that the analogy is not quite right. By and large a 
plumber’s or a dentist's value judgements do not greatly influence what he 
does and there are few value debates concerning the specific goals/tasks set
for him. This is simply not true in economics. To choose an end very often
is, in large part, to choose a means and vice versa. If economics is a means, 
albeit a necessary means, not an end in itself, than it is especially 
important to recognise this fact not to overlook nor to suppress it. There is 
a very good reason why Adam Smith and John Stewart Mill, just as much as Karl 
Marx, viewed themselves as political economists. If economics is to be a
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servant discipline and a means, within an historic and objective context, to 
attaining basically normative "human dimension" (social and political) ends 
set by a political (or political economic and socio economic) process, it is 
essential for its value laden nature (not only as to ’economic' ends but also 
as to many economic means and policies) to be identified and understood. It 
is failure to do so which leads to economics (purportedly value free as in 
neo-liberalism1^) as an imperial discipline and to a development discourse 
which is overly economistic, or even economystic, in content and terminology.
This problem is distinctly more real at intellectual than at operational 
level. The terms of a discourse may conceal its content (with or without 
distorting it) e.g. up to the 1970s virtually all Francophone African 
political discourse was conducted in Marxist terminology (or jargon) whatever 
the content, in the Cote d'Ivoire or Guinea, Senegal or Mali. Similarly 
political decision takers do not in fact operate as technical economic 
maximisers even when available (and external funder acceptable) discourse 
makes them sound as if they do. That point is largely independent of whether 
they are accountable (and to whom) and/or genuinely seeking to implement 
aspirations of some constituency (of whatever nature) to whom they feel 
responsible. This is still more true at movement and mass level - the 
students who defiantly cried out "Sankara or nothing" after his murder were 
making a development ideology statement but hardly an economic centred one. 
Nonetheless, the triumphalist march of economic terminology and - to a lesser 
extent - conceptualisation and goal setting is a real problem especially at 
the intellectual discourse level and not merely (or even most severely) in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.
Development And Economic Growth
Development is not adequately or accurately equated with growth. Africans 
are, with few exceptions (and those few usually victims of intellectual 
neo-colonialism or over exposure to economistic triumphalism) in no need of 
being told that. It is a sermon better preached from Africa to Europe than 
vice versa.
11Professor Adelman as cited by Professor Murteira is fully in accord with 
viewing development as about people and their welfare/attainment of potential
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(however defined) but, as a result, does not seek to define development only 
its economic supporting structure. Professor Perroux goes further but in 
part in a very special Western way. Like Schumpeter he argues that an 
economic centred system erodes values and basic goals without creating 
replacements and is therefore ultimately historically unsustainable. But he 
does so in a context of assumed linear progress and of a degree of priority to 
individual autonomy over social group solidarity and order which is quite 
un-African - indeed quite unusual historically globally, though not in the 
West since the philosophes.
If development is primarily oriented toward human (in social relations and as
individual persons) goals and toward relaxing constraints on human potential
fulfillment, it cannot be universal at the levels of articulation and -
especially - operation. Historic and objective contexts do shape such goals -
a decent burial in ones home area is seen as a basic human need in Africa (as
in China and rural Portugal) but not in most of Northern Europe or North
America; the crippling and limiting aspects of the traditional extended family
systems - as perceived by growing numbers of Africans - both cause their
erosion/force their transformation and also affect normative goals and
appropriate economic policies. The quest for universal packages - as opposed
1 "3to widely useable guideposts - is a quest for El Dorado (or Prester John) 
and, as the examples cited may suggest, an export not an import substitute 
industry.
But to say with Mwalimu Nyerere that the only justification, measure and 
yardstick of development is human beings is not to deny that productive forces 
- and therefore economics - are of great importance as a means. Indeed he 
goes on to stress this and to warn that therefore it may be necessary to adopt 
economic organisational forms which are unattractive or even undesirable in 
themselves to win material resources to further non-economic ends. Similarly 
doubt as to linear (let alone steady) economic growth does not reduce the 
importance of economic resources nor of political economy, especially in the 
very poor countries of Africa. It was precisely in that context that Nyerere 
remarked that in low income socialist countries waste is a cardinal sin.
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Utopia: Guiding Vision, Ignis Fatuis or Police State?
Broadly coherent normative mobilising worldviews are crucial to development - 
indeed to operational nationhood and to state or party ability to carry out 
programmes; to retain credibility when times are bad and secure acceptance of 
sacrifices. This is a fact which is very much outside the scope of technical 
economics or of simplistic output/modernisation maximisation discussion. Such 
worldviews are variously termed: weltanchaung, paradigm; but the commonest and 
most recurrent term is probably Utopia. Unfortunately in recent years applied 
development thinking has tended to use that term either perjoratively ("a mere 
Utopia”, "unrealistic Utopianism" or without any serious attention to the uses 
and abuses, benefits and costs of Utopias in general and - especially - of 
particular Utopias in particular contexts.
The importance and explicit consideration given to the concept and use of
Utopia by Professor Murteira is welcome but may not go far enough. Utopia
indeed means "no place" but usually in the sense of not yet or not here and
now but to be sought - the New Jerusalem in the early Church and the stage of
Communism in Marx are both Utopias but both are ones which it was devoutly
believed would presently (sooner rather than later) be achieved. Plato may
have felt the Republic to be unattainable - and so wrote other treatises for
application (in an inversion of Machiavelli’s applicable Prince and desired
Laws) - but he did believe it should be sought and could serve as a benchmark
against which to test real systems. This is even more true of guideline to
action Utopias such as What Now? Another Development (which would have better
15been titled "Other Developments" ) or the ILO's Employment, Growth and Basic
Needs (a utopia manque but the nearest a UN agency has ever been able to
. , 16. get! ).
But Utopias can be used in three ways: as long range visions to which to lift 
ones eyes for reinspiration from short term drudgery; as distant landmarks 
against which to measure and in the direction of which to orient short and 
medium term directly operational strategy and policy and as detailed rule 
books to be imposed - to the maximum extent possible here and now.
The last can be disposed of - intellectually - quickly. It is the road to 
counter utopia. Plato's Guardians - if one is less unlucky than most - become 
in reality Antonio Salazaar and Plato's Warriors the PIDE. The first is
perhaps exemplified by the African (Banjul Declaration) human and peoples' 
rights charter and can be of genuine inspirational, symbolic and hortatory use 
- not least in the Banjul Declaration case because it is clearly African and 
contextual (e.g. in terms of the articulation of peoples' rights) not European 
and global.
However, the most important case is probably the second. Here results vary - 
in Tanzania the Arusha Declaration and in SADCC (Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference) the Lusaka Declaration have been of continuing value 
in giving a sense of direction, a platform for mobilisation, a test of results 
and a base for formulating next steps. In other cases, while the initial 
results have been similar, they tended to falter or halt with an apparent loss 
of sense of direction and a rise in cynicism or an erosion of continued belief 
in ultimate attainability as to the Utopia. Aquino da Braganza saw Mozambique 
as such a case in large part because when the first - articulated - stage of 
national political liberation had been won no equally seriously analysed, 
politically tested and politically mobilising second stage had even been begun 
to be formulated. That applies to many independence coalitions and is 
additional to the fact that different stages may require different sub-class 
coalitions. One final question arises as to whether the Utopia itself remains 
unchanged. Probably not but in the sense that, e.g., Mount Kilimanjaro 
’changes' as seen and perceived as one approaches it. That of course is an 
added argument against the "street plan for the New Jerusalem" detailed Utopia 
and in favour of the principle and guideline or signpost style.
Interactions
The five topics sketched above interact. If development is primarily a set of
human oriented ends with political economy as a set of means no universal - or 
17even all African - detailed development ideology or strategy is practicable.
If peoples, leaders and their states operate on that presumption (however
intuitive its formulation) then development ideology, strategy, policy as well
18as results and evaluation of results will necessarily diverge. And, perhaps 
most crucially, any attempt to view development in a global, economistic, 
intellectual oriented paradigm will fail either to identify actual evolving 
African development ideologies and strategies or their very real divergences
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What African states are most nearly alike in - since 1979 though not before - 
is economic unsuccess, albeit even there the record is much more and much more 
complexly divergent than realised. For example, how many realise that 
Tanzania going into its "externally approved" rehabilitation phase of 
adjustment in late 1986 had three years of rising real Gross Domestic Product 
and a 3-5% annual food output growth rate (with 1986 on or above the trend 
line) behind it? In depth and strength of nationhood, resilience in the face 
of crises and disasters, priority to and progress toward certain human 
condition aspects (e.g. immunisation, rural primary health care, universal 
functional literacy) the divergences are immense. It is not quite whimsical 
to argue that on national unity aspects Zaire is closer to Belgium than either 
is to Tanzania and on human condition Botswana is nearer to - say - Sweden 
than is Portugal.
Amilcar Cabral stresses that however rich and fine the realities of others
might be, African reality could only be constructed by Africans. By the same
token African development ideology, strategy and results can - however rich
global or European constructs may be - can only be fully comprehended by
including (the present author would argue starting from) actual African and
19Africa (or African state) centred perspectives.
What Is To Be Done? The Human Condition
The pressing issues from this perspective relate to sustaining development
ideologies and Utopias which retain credibility and mobilising power and to do
so by tackling key challenges at once. One is the human condition - roughly
what social indicators attempt to measure. If development is about people
this cannot wait until after several years of rapid growth. If human resource
economics (or Nobel Laureate Robert Solow's growth causal decomposition models
or for that matter common sense are right) mass illiteracy, penury,
malnutrition, illness and exclusion/invisibility of women are major barriers
to rapid growth. Adam Smith emphasised that no nation can be great and
prosperous the majority of whose people are poor and miserable. Nor is there
any absolute need to have rapid growth nor massive new (as opposed to
20reallocated) resources to make progress on this front as exemplified by
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divergences in African (and global) results rather uncorrelated to the depth
21of economic crises.
Nationhood and Participation
Ability to hang together in adversity and to claw back from disaster depends 
on a sense of community, at national level nationhood. That requires not 
rhetoric but a Utopia that is broadly shared, a belief that the state is 
struggling toward achieving that dream and at least some faith that it can 
avert the killing of the dream. These are unlikely to be achieved without at 
least some broadly based participation systems - economic, social and 
political.
In this sense Mozambique has shown itself to have a strong sense of 
nationhood. It is no accident that its video on the bandidos armados is 
entitled ’’Killing The Dream” or that the defiant answer (mass as well as 
elite) is ’’The Dream Lives!”. The weight of successive catastrophes has 
endangered credibility as to state capacity and threatened to destroy 
participation. Again the emphasis on getting food relief out to every area 
even conceivably accessible and - last year - on continuing the multi-stage 
electoral crisis throughout the high tide of the South African/bandidos ’’final 
solution to the Mozambique problem” campaign were not accidental nor 
peripheral but integrally logical and central.
One major threat to nationhood - and to participation - is external 
aggression. This is most true in Southern Africa and in the Moroccan occupied 
Saharan Democratic Republic.
External Aggression: Apartheid or Liberation
The dominant locus of external aggression is Southern Africa (including 
occupied Namibia) and its main arena for action Southern Africa. The 
aggressor is the South African state (doubtless with external allies but 
shaping the broad nature as well as the details of that aggression).
- 1 1 -
For up to ten countries that aggression is the major constraint on economic
progress (and therefore productive force augmentation to serve other aspects
of development. In Angola and Mozambique it is the dominant fact in every
aspect of survival as well as of development. By the end of 1988 1,500,000
souls who would otherwise have been alive were dead and over $50,000 million
of national output (two years actual output) had been lost to the SADCC states
22as the price of Pretoria.
The clash is between African liberation and development defined by Africans 
and creating a safe and profitable regional context for apartheid. Regional 
aggression cannot, in fact, make South Africa safe for apartheid is true but 
so long as the South African apartheid leadership’s false consciousness that 
it can remains the effects on the region are the same. In this struggle - and 
here I disagree totally with Professor Murteira - there is no "viable
compromise" on the basic issue. There is no middle ground and no room for
neutrals - the choice is between liberation and apartheid.
What comes after apartheid? How are changes in the Republic phased once the
2^basic transfer of power takes place? What regional tactics and sequences
are optional? Those are questions open to debate and, in some respect,
"viable compromise" is possible. However, the utter failure of white
24reformism in South Africa from Schriener and Hofmeyer to Botha and the grim 
road from the Nkomati Accord to the end of Samora’s plane in the hills above 
Nkomati should be answer enough for those who think there is either an easy
way to transfer of power or much room for slower and softer regional tactics.
Indeed the dramatic military and transport turn-around over the past year with 
South Africa losing the battle of the Limpopo Valley rail line in Mozambique 
and the battle for Kuito Canavale in Angola, suggests precisely the opposite.
A Southern African regional alternative to dependence on apartheid South 
Africa is a necessary defensive and developmental objective. The existence, 
statements and actions of the Front Line States and SADCC underline that fact 
as well as going some distance toward its attainment. But they do so in the 
face of antagonistic contradiction (as Samora Machel termed it even in his 
address at the signing of the Nkomati Agreement) not of an arena for pragmatic 
compromises.
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External Economic Environment; Riding The Hurricane
Given the divergence of African economic results before 1979 and the 
divergence of policies then and since it is fairly clear - as even the World 
Bank agrees - that Sub-Saharan Africa's economic crises are very largely 
caused by a worsening external economic climate. But - as retired President 
Obasanjo of Nigeria has warned - African logic, passion and rhetoric cannot 
significantly alter this environment or its evolution. That is the bitter 
reality underlying the words unilateral external economic dependence.
Therefore, Africa and African states must seek to adjust to the international 
economic hurricane beating on them by sailing to smoother waters ("delinking", 
"regional economic cooperation", etc.), putting out sea anchors (e.g. 
collecting on the international commitments to Africa's Priority Programme For 
Economic Recovery - APPER - made at the 1986 UN Special Session) and battening 
down the hatches and steering into the gale ("stabilisation" and "structural 
adjustment") to claw off the rocks of a lee shore.
That does mean some form of stabilisation and adjustment - concepts over which
the IMF and World Bank (contrary to popular perception) hold neither any
intellectual property rights nor unique wisdom. To say most African states
are seeking to stabilise and to adjust and that all these programmes have some
common features is true - and trite. There are only so many ways to respond
to losses of total real resources. Therefore the 1986 Algerian stabilisation
programme which is totally indigenous is almost more draconic in external
balance and fiscal deficit compression than the IMF would have advocated.
What is in the present context more interesting are the divergences: Algeria's
(and basically Tanzania's) "liberalisation" has more in common with Lenin's
New Economic Policy than with neo-liberalism; "human dimension" advocates are
27steadily gaining ground in Ghana adjustment formulations ; Zimbabwe won 
through its 1982-84 crisis without the IMF because it thought its own
pO
formulation better. The differences relate to the natures and historic 
contexts of the states and to their development ideologies and strategies.
The operational dilemma of delinking approaches to date (as Professor Murteira 
very clearly and cogently stresses) is their failure to give viable short term 
answers to the question of method. As Chairman Mao said, it is not useful to 
talk of crossing a river without identifying and/or constructing a ford, a
25
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bridge, a boat or a tunnel. That is precisely the weakest point of Samir 
Amin's or Ajit Singh's or A. M. Babu's economic Utopias - their lack of 
identifying practicable first steps on the long journey. Delinking from 
exports first - as has been widely, if not always deliberately, practiced - is 
not a practicable way to self-reliance. Au contraire, as Amir Jamal of 
Tanzania warned in 1970; it runs a high risk of delivering a country bound 
hand and foot into the hands of its creditors and/or donors.
Structural adjustment toward greater national and regional integration (in an 
input/output or circuit of production sense) is a practicable means. It does 
include selective industrialisation (and selective export promotion, possibly 
but not necessarily of manufactures) as well as priority to food and energy 
import substitution. But it is a partial and - more important - dominantly a 
medium term answer. Smoother waters are not readily reachable, sea anchors 
(external resource transfers) and beating into the hurricane (stabilisation) 
are the only practicable dominant short term answers for most African 
economies.
29Rehabilitation And Reconstruction: Clawing Back
But riding out a gale - surviving - is a minimum necessary goal, not an 
adequate one. Most Africans and African societies, economies and states have 
passed that test - though not all, millions of human beings are prematurely 
dead and for them there can be no rehabilitation, reconstruction and renewed 
development. At a national level the combination of contradictory development 
ideologies (or sub-class interests) and too rigid, too rapid pursuit of a 
Utopia most Burkinabe did believe in has killed Thomas Sankara and - at least 
for a time - that Utopia is buried with him. Even if not enough, survival 
(like economic growth) matters.
Rehabilitation and reconstruction cannot mean simply restoring 1978 in 
Tanzania, 1958 in Ghana, 1973 in Zambia. Subsequent events have cruelly 
exposed structural, institutional and productive forces pattern flaws. Even 
had they not, the past external economic environment cannot be reconstructed 
(most certainly not by African states severally or jointly). What changes are 
necessary and possible is a contextual question: what existed historically? 
How badly is it debilitated? In what ways is it flawed and how? For what
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measures and projects can domestic and other resources be mobilised? What is 
the present mobilising Utopia and what changes, priorities and sequences does 
it require? Different aspects pose different degrees of difficulty in 
answering operationally and also different degrees of urgency in answering in 
different countries. In Mozambique it is a bitter reality that armed 
aggression has in one sense strengthened the immediate mobilising power of the 
Utopia - it was at its strongest during the political liberation war and this 
is a second (and harsher) one. In Tanzania with restored growth, major 
aspects of the Arusha Utopia regaining mobilising capacity as their current 
and recent past weakness has been credibility not desiredness. Per contra in 
Ghana the interim ideological crazy guilt which is fourth hand Nkrumahite plus 
participatory populist plus neo-Platonic Utopia badly needs reforging into a 
new synthesis. That is all the more the case because recovery of productive 
forces is proceeding moderately rapidly and - perhaps - substainably in purely 
economic terms.
And Thus To Renewed Development
Rehabilitation and reconstruction (unless literally rebuilding exactly as 
before politically and socially as well as economically) are partly and form 
part of renewed development. The joint Tanzanian-UNICEF-Danish rural health 
reconstruction initiative of 1984, in fact, increases the capacity and dynamic 
potential in that system beyond any previous high point even though overall 
Tanzania is - as it explicitly states - in a recovery and reconstruction 
phase.
But rehabilitation and recovery priorities may not be identical to those of 
renewed development proper. For one thing economic necessity is likely to 
bind more tightly and economic growth (not least in productivity of and 
production by poor people) to be more often an overriding priority. But again 
the dynamics - and especially the productive participation and political 
economic power distribution - set in motion by rehabilitation and 
reconstruction will influence the possible courses of subsequent development 
so that the latter (at least in broad outline) needs to be partially 
(strategically?) articulated early on in rehabilitating and reconstructing if 
expensive backtracking, permanent distortions or high cost contradictions are 
to be averted.
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One has reason to hope - and to believe - at least a number of the renewed 
developments will be more strongly based on contextually related Utopias 
(ideologies) and strategies which are both consistent with them and 
practicable to implement. The lessons of experience and the time to learn are 
- often though not always - likely to survive and to help divert the avalanche 
of neo-liberal, Eurocentric preaching backed by conditionality.
In respect to this process as well as to rehabilitation and reconstruction the 
immediate and necessary conceptual and ideological base is contextual and 
applicable more than intellectual and global. This is relevant to Professor 
Murteira's point that structuralism has never evolved a rigorous, global level 
theoretical model and Cardoso's that dependency writing - at its best - 
analyses case studies and sets out tool kits of guidelines. Indeed so, but as 
indigenous - initially nationally oriented - antitheses to economistic, global 
development ideologies these comments do suggest structuralists did tackle 
their own top priorities first, even if structuralism could (and probably 
should) have been more rigorously, systematically and generally developed by 
some of its major intellectual architects (including Cardoso) than has been 
the case to date.
■30Knowledge, Technology And Relative Autonomy
Africa was colonised and has remained externally dependent primarily because 
of specialised knowledge and technology (including soft institutional and hard 
physical technology) gaps. From the astralobe to the Gatling gun the record 
of conquest is one of applied technological domination.
Initially the keys to conquest were margins in long distance navigation 
technologies and in military technologies to 'protect' the incursions made 
possible by navigation. At that point Lagos and Prince Henry were at the 
cutting edge of imperial and technological expansion even if that position was 
soon to be seized by more northerly powers and the demise of Portugal’s global 
knowledge leadership sealed and symbolised by the Treaty of Methuen.
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Technology, and applicable knowlege more generally, are not the same as 'pure*
knowledge nor as totally ’new' knowledge. It is perfectly true that the
Portuguese navigators did not discover the inhabited territories they explored 
nor even the sea routes across the Indian Ocean and on to China. The
residents knew where they lived, the sea routes had been (at least 
cumulatively by stages) trade routes for centuries. But the navigators did 
put together a whole cartographic picture from Europe to the Far East (and 
Brazil) by sea which had not existed before. Even more important they fitted 
that knowledge into their maritime applied technology and their political and 
economic system in a way which created Portugal's trading wealth and its far 
flung mercantile empire. Pure science in large part no, totally knew
knowledge in many cases no; but new applications of knowledge based on fitting 
separate pieces together - very much yes. In that sense the navigators and
their sponsors were very much the predecessors of today's TWCs in their
approach to collection, fitting together and application of knowledge.
With colonisation the gaps became more general partly by conscious action but
partly because colonies - as James Mill put it - were viewed as useful places
to carry on certain metropolitan economic activities not as countries or 
territories in their own right and knowledge/technology creation was rarely 
and limitedly perceived to be such an activity. And so to use Walter 
Rodney's words "Europe underdeveloped Africa".
Independence did not redress that dependence nor even halt the processes 
widening the gap. Africa is still grappling with them with unequal, but on 
average distressingly limited, success. This is in part because of a mistaken 
view that all or almost all applicable knowledge is value free and context 
mobile and an equally mistaken mirror image view that none or almost none is 
either.^1
Here, if anywhere, contextual specificity, unpackaging and priorities need 
attention. Utopias, strategies and socio-political institutions travel very 
badly as, intriguingly, do universities. Pure bits and pieces of hard 
technology (if the importer has the capacity to operate and to maintain and 
can speedily develop that to replicate and to adapt) often travel rather well. 
Most knowledge/technology is in between and the ways in which this is so and 
why are rarely either simple or intuitively obvious. In respect to applied 
Utopia and strategy (but not their intellectual levels) and, on the whole, to
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mass and skill creating education many African countries have made substantial 
progress. Institutional innovation and hard technology adaptation and 
replication has - unevenly - also gone further than is usually realised 
(perhaps especially than realised by ’'high" technology focussed Africans 
trained in the Western technology policy research weltanschaung or its 
"intermediate technology" mutant).
But knowledge/technology adaptation and innovation remain weak areas and ones 
inadequately conceptualised or built into Utopias or strategies despite the 
brave attempt in the OAU’s 1980 Lagos Plan. Until that is achieved selective 
importation and adaptation synthesised with indigenous innovation (the 
Japanese and Korean processes on the open, and the Indian and Chao en Lai’s 
contribution to the Chinese strategy on the less open end of the spectrum) 
will remain error prone, inefficient, problematic, partial and badly 
understood in ways which hamper either structurally or incrementally improving 
the transfer-mastery-incorporation process.
In Process
From a European perspective - as Professor Murteira’s lead paper ably 
demonstrates - Africa looks distressingly uniformly unsuccessful. From the 
opposite (African) end of the telescope there is a great deal more diversity,
complexity and evidence of positive changes. Both of us of course may suffer
the fate of that first futurologist on Africa - Pliny - who in consternation
at how new facts upset his models exclaimed "Out of Africa there is always
something new!"
That Africans confront major obstacles and live in a harsh set of interacting 
environments is only too true. But for many - and in many countries - "The 
Dream Lives", "a luta continua". "Vitoria e certe" may seem much more 
problematic but in the context of Utopias it is an essential faith because 
without it mobilisation (in any sense including economic resources) becomes 
impossible. For that matter to Africans - if not to outsiders - it is 
literally necessary. Failure to develop will sooner or later mean failure to 
survive, as it already has for millions of souls prematurely dead in the past 
decade.
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The appropriate envoi may be a Tanzanian Lake Zone proverb which was 
Chairman Nyerere opening the South Commission in reference to the 
struggle for autonomous, self-defined South-South interaction:
Rabbit, where are you going?
I am going out to kill the elephant.
Can you really do that?
Well, I’ll try. And try again.
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Notes
1. Reginald Herbold Green, now a Professorial Fellow of the Institute of 
Development Studies at the University of Sussex has been a student of the 
political economy of Africa for almost 30 years. He has served on the 
staff of, or as consultant to, several African universities, governments, 
liberation movements and interstate organisations as well as to UNICEF, 
WFP, ILO, the World Council of Churches, the International Center on Law 
in Development, UNCTAD and the Catholic Institute for International 
Relations.
2. Professor Mazrui's film on Africa was criticised in Europe/North America 
as anti-Western but in Africa (especially West Africa) as the superficial 
distorted view of an outsider who was neither very wise nor sympathetic. 
In the case of UNESCO the overconcentration on headquarters and pomp and 
on intellectual vogue conferences like the sloppiness of administration 
and the systematic, demoralising use of favouritism to control staff and 
of project allocations to silence critics were the hallmarks of Renee 
Mahev's UNESCO. His successor was as identifiably a certain type of
French intellectual as he and followed the same paths.
3. Ironically this may be most true when the state trend is otherwise - the
sudden upsurge of Tanzanian neo-liberal economists at the University of 
Dar es Salaam appears to be an example. Academicians often like to be 
enfants terribles and to swim against the tide, a characteristic with its
uses - and limitations or abuses.
4. Eurocentric as used in this paper includes Central and Eastern Europe, 
the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. For some purposes the 
USSR and Japan might need to be excluded or qualified but probably not 
for the present ones.
5. The history of self-styled "left" writing on Nkrumahism in theory and
practice in Ghana and on Ujamaa villages and the Arusha Declaration 
process in Tanzania are clearcut examples.
6. For example, in Zaire it is not unfair to say indigenousness is a fig
leaf to cover the naked realities of national disintegration and rampant 
external dependence. In the later stages of Sekov Toure’s Guinea it was
a mobilising slogan against the necessary (whether real or no) external
enemy. In the work of Senghor it is a cultural and human identity 
affirmation.
7. In both Algeria and Tanzania the balance of all statements and actions
suggests Lenin on the New Economic Policy more than Berg or von Hayek on
the magic of the market. In Zimbabwe better use of the private sector 
to complement the public and state acquisition of control over the 
largest industrial combine are (correctly in their strategy) seen as 
wholly consistent.
8. i.e. Galtung.
9. Perroux, Adelman, Amin.
10. In fact the operative word is purportedly. Von Hayek, Friedman and many 
other neo-liberals do have a normative creed. It can be summed up as 
’’free markets make free men” or, to be less flattering, the magic 
emancipation of the mystical market mechanism.
11. Page p 35.
12. Page pp 35-37.
13- Both did have objective correlatives but hardly ones congruent with the 
mythical figures sought.
14. A terminology presumably reflecting a synthesis of Marxian socialist and 
Catholic intellectual influences.
15. As one of the authors and of those responsible for the title my 
recollection is that its wording related to catching reader potential and 
its consistency with the content which inherently denies the desirability 
of a single development paradigm (or indeed its validity) was not really 
considered.
16. Governmental, employer and trade union clearance excised almost all of 
the political infrastructure of the drafting group (including the present 
author) text - but even so the coherence and force of the balance is far 
beyond what normally can survive such a least common denominator, 
neutering process.
17. The contexts of the 51 American states (plus Namibia and South Africa) 
vary immensely.
18. That is the same objective result will be valued differently in different 
cases.
19. Which does not deny the contribution more abstract, formal intellectual 
and general approaches can make, especially at comparative and trajectory 
plotting levels. Not incidentally there is a resurgence of nationalism 
in Europe parallel to that of supranationalism while its emergence in 
Southern Africa is not merely parallel to that of firmly backed regional 
coordination but a driving force behind the latter.
20. cf. "The Broken Pot: The Social Fabric, Economic Disaster And Adjustment
In Africa”, paper presented at the Institute For African Alternatives 
(IFFA) 1987 Conference, The Impact Of IMF And World Bank Policies On The 
People Of Africa, London, September 1987, and "The Human Dimension As The 
Test Of And A Means To Achieving Africa's Economic Recovery And 
Development: Reweaving The Social Fabric, Restoring The Broken Pot”,
paper presented at the International Conference on the Human Dimension of 
Africa's Economic Recovery and Development for United Nations Economic 
Commission For Africa (UNECA), Khartoum, Sudan, 5-8 March 19 8 8, 
ECA/ICHD/88/3 and ECA/ICHD/88/3/Add.1, by the present author for fuller 
articulations.
21. cf., e.g. G. A. Cornia, A. R. Jolly and F. Stewart, Adjustment With A
Human Face; Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth, A Study by 
UNICEF, Oxford, 1 9 8 7-
22. cf., e.g. Children On The Front Line, UNICEF, New York, 1987 (authors R. 
H. Green, M. Mauras, D. Asrat, R. Morgan) and 1989 revised edition.
23. Incidentally to evaluate South Africa as a neo-classical state in
economic terms (as does Potter cited by Professor Murteira) is rather 
less plausible than to make the same assertion as to Salazaar’s "New 
Order". South Africa has been from its birth in the Zuid Afrikaans 
Republik (the original Transvaal Republic) economically interventionist 
for political economic strategic reasons and marked by intra-European 
tribal (and - to a large degree until recently coterminus - class 
conflicts) conflicts, plus a manipulated, administratively regulated
exploitation of a black sub-proletariat, not faith in market magic, have
shaped the dominant development ideology there.
24. This is in one sense deeply unfair to the memories of Oliver Schreiner 
and Jan Hofmeyer. But in dynamic and systemic terms "Piet Wappen" (Pete 
the Gun) Botha is the heir of the Cape liberal Afrikaaner tradition and, 
as such, the evidence of its tragic failure to cope with, or prioritise 
within, reality (especially the reality of Black South Africans).
25. For fuller accounts see "Sub-Saharan Africa: Toward economic recovery or 
oblivion?", Journal of Development Planning, No. 15, 1985.
26. For a series of analyses and case studies see C. Colclough and R. H. 
Green (editors) "Stabilisation - For Growth or Decay? Short Run Costs and 
Long Run Uncertainties in Africa", IDS Bulletin, 19-1> January 19 8 8.
27. See Ghana article in ibid.
28. For a fuller account see X. Kadhani and R. H. Green, "Parameters as 
warnings and guide posts: the case of Zimbabwe", JDP, op cit.
29. See T. Rose (editor), Crisis and Recovery in Sub-Saharan Africa OECD 
Development Centre, Paris, 1985 for a series of papers around this set of 
topics.
30. See World Council of Churches Commission on the Churches’ Participation 
in Development, Transnational Corporations, Technology And Human 
Development, Geneva, 1981, for a fuller articulation.
31. That is in itself a somewhat reductionist formulation. It is quite 
possible, for example, to hold the former position in repect to hard 
technology and - apparently - technical institutions and the second in 
respect to ideologies and socio-political institutions and technologies.
